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ABSTRACT
We consider the principal-agent problem with heterogeneous agents. Previous works
assume that the principal signs independent incentive contracts with every agent
to make them invest more efforts on the tasks. However, in many circumstances,
these contracts need to be identical for the sake of fairness. We investigate the
optimal common contract problem. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to
consider this natural and important generalization. We first show this problem is
NP-complete. Then we provide a dynamic programming algorithm to compute the
optimal contract in O(n2m) time, where n,m are the number of agents and actions,
under the assumption that the agents’ cost functions obey increasing difference
property. At last, we generalize the setting such that each agent can choose to
directly produce a reward in [0, 1]. We provide an O(log n)-approximate algorithm
for this generalization.
1 Introduction
Principal-agent theory is a subfield of mechanism design theory. The principal hires an agent to
accomplish a task. The agent is able to take actions on behalf of the principal. Agent’s different
actions lead to different rewards the principal receives. Moral hazard occurs when the agent acts
in his own interest which may be in conflict with the principal’s interest. Therefore the principal
designs an incentive contract with the agent to maximize the principal’s utility subject to the agent’s
utility being maximized. The contract is a transfer function from the principal to the agent which
could depend on the outcome which is affected by the agent’s action.
Many economic interactions fit in the principal-agent model. For example, a firm (principal) hires a
salesman (agent) to sell products. The salesman invests effort on selling products. More efforts he
invests, more products will be sold. To incentivize salesman invest more efforts, the firm can set a
bonus depending on the amount of products a salesman has sold. A salesman wants to maximize his
utility which is defined to be his bonus minus his efforts. The firm’s utility is the revenue generated
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from selling products minus the bonus paid to salesmen. The central question in this research field
asks: What is the principal’s optimal contract?
Due to the wide application, principal-agent model has been extensively studied [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. The
agent takes a hidden action like effort which cannot be observed by the principal directly. The
principal can only observe the outcome of this action and the contract is designed to depend on the
outcome only. Most works focus on the problem with one principal and one agent [6, 7]. When
the agent takes different actions, there is a different distribution over principal’s reward. Given the
distribution information, the optimal contract can be computed efficiently through linear programs.
In this paper, we consider the problem when there is one principal and multiple heterogeneous
agents. These agents could be good at different tasks and we do not assume any relationship
between the cost for different tasks among different agents. For sake of the fairness, we do not allow
the principal design personal contracts for different agents. Instead, the principal has to design a
common contract that applies to every agents. We assume the mapping from the action played to
the outcome is deterministic. So the principal knows every agent’s action by observing her outcome.
The difficulty in our model stems from the multiple agents. Since the principal can only use a
common contract, he needs to balance the incentivization for every agent.
1.1 Our Contribution
Our contribution can be summarized as follows.
1. We first show that the optimal contract problem with heterogeneous agents is strongly
NP-complete.
2. We then proposes an O(n2m) dynamic programming algorithm, where n is the number of
agents and m is the number of actions, to compute an optimal contract under the assumption
that the agents’ costs obey increasing differences.
3. Next, we generalize the discrete-action setting such that each agent can choose to directly
produce a reward in [0, 1]. We shows that this generalization is harder than the original
discrete-action version, and provides an O(log n)-approximate algorithm for this generaliza-
tion.
1.2 Other Related Works
Other works also consider multiple agents but in different angles [8, 9, 10]. They assume the union
of agents’ actions together determines the outcome. The contract is personalized and specifies the
payment in every possible outcome. Therefore the payment to an agent depends on both his action
and other agents’ actions. In contrast, in our paper, the payment to an agent only depends on his own
action. In their setting, Babaioff et al. consider that each agent only has a binary action space [8],
Babaioff and Winter consider the tradeoff between simplicity of the contract and the performance
of it [10].
Lavi and Shamash study the model with multiple principals and multiple agents [11]. Agents do
not have cost on actions. This model focuses on the competition between principals. McAfee and
McMillan study another totally different problem where multiple agents compete for a principal’s
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contract [12]. A recent work of Azizan et al. studies a model that is almost the same as ours where
each agent can choose to directly produce a real number reward [13]. However, they assume the
designed payment function can be parameterized by a vector in a given set A ⊆ Rd, and their
algorithm explores the whole set A, which is not that efficient.
2 Problem Description
In this paper, we study the Multiple Agents Contract Problem. There is a principal, n agents and m
actions. Each agent can take an action j ∈ [m] and produces a reward ρj ≥ 0 for the principal. The
reward only depends on the action, not on the agent. Each agent i also has a cost ci,j ≥ 0 to take an
action j. This cost depends on both the agent and the action. Besides the m actions, there is always
a zero action with reward 0 such that the cost for each agent to take this action is 0. This action
means it is free for each agent to choose to produce nothing. The principal specifies a payment
profile (t1, t2, . . . , tm): each agent taking action j will earn a payment tj . The utility for agent i
to take action j is tj − ci,j . The agents are self-interested meaning each agent will take an action
that maximizes its utility. W.l.o.g., we assume the agents tie-break in favor of the principal. The
payoff of the principal is the sum of rewards produced by the agents minus the payments given to
the agents, i.e., if agent i takes action i∗, the payoff of the principal is
∑n
i=1(ρi∗ − ti∗). Our goal is
to design the payment profile (t1, t2, . . . , tm) to maximize the payoff of the principal.
Example 1. Suppose there are two agents and two actions. The rewards for the two actions are
8 and 10 respectively. For action 1, agent 1 has a cost 5 and agent 2 has a cost 4. For action 2,
agent 1 has a cost 9 and agent 2 has a cost 2. Without agent 2, we can set the payments for the two
actions to 5 and 0 respectively, which brings a payoff of 3 to the principal. Without agent 1, we
can set the payments for the two actions to 0 and 2 respectively, which brings a payoff of 8 to the
principal. However, when the two agents both exist, no matter how we set the payments, the payoff
of the principal cannot achieve 3 + 8 = 11. It is optimal to the payments for the two actions to 5
and 3 respectively, which brings a payoff of 10 to the principal.
3 Hardness
The problem defined in the previous section is very hard. To see its hardness, let us consider its
decision version, i.e., the problem of determining whether there is a payment profile (t1, t2, . . . , tm)
such that the payoff of the principal is no less than a given number r. For convenience, we call this
decision problem MAC. We will show in the following theorem that MAC is strongly NP-complete.
Theorem 1. MAC is strongly NP-complete.
Proof. MAC obviously belongs to NP. In the following proof, we reduce the well-known NP-
complete problem Not-All-Equal 3-Satisfiability (NAE3SAT) to MAC to show that MAC is strongly
NP-complete.
Given an instance of NAE3SAT with n variables and m clauses (we assume the variables in one
clause are different without loss of generality), we build an instance of MAC as follows. For any
variable x in an instance of NAE3SAT, we define x0 as its negation and define x1 = x.
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• Agents
– For each variable xi, we have an agent Ai.
– For each literal xbi and each clause cj , we have an agent T bi,j .
– For each clause cj , we have 6 agents Vj,1, Vj,2, . . . , Vj,6.
• Actions
– We have a zero action zero with reward 0.
– For each literal xbi , we have an action variablebi with reward ρ1.
– For each clause cj , we have 6 actions clausej,1, . . . , clausej,6 with reward ρ2.
• Costs
– For the zero action zero, each agent has a cost 0.
– For action variablebi , agent Ai has a cost δ, and T bi,j has a cost 0 for each j.
– For action clausej,k, agent Vj,k has a cost 0.
– For action clausej,k where cj = xb1i1 ∨xb2i2 ∨xb3i3 , the costs vary for different k’s and are
summarized in Table 1. Note there are exactly 3 agents with cost 1 to take this action.
We call the three agents the associated agents of this action.
– For each action and agent, if we do not mention the cost above, the cost is greater than
the reward of the action.
The parameters ρ1, ρ2, δ satisfy the following constraints.6
ρ1 − δ > m((2n− 3)(ρ2 − ρ1) + nδ + 4), (1)
δ > 3(ρ2 − ρ1 − 1), (2)
ρ2 − ρ1 > 2. (3)
Figure 1 shows an example instance of MAC corresponding to an instance of NAE3SAT with 4
variables and 2 clauses x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3 and x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ x4.
Table 1: Cost Table
T b1i1 T
b2
i2
T b3i3 T
1−b1
i1
T 1−b2i2 T
1−b3
i3
clausej,1 1 1 - - - 1
clausej,2 1 - 1 - 1 -
clausej,3 - 1 1 1 - -
clausej,4 - - 1 1 1 -
clausej,5 - 1 - 1 - 1
clausej,6 1 - - - 1 1
Then we ask whether we can set the payments to the agents so that the optimal payoff of the
principal is no less than
n(ρ1 − δ) +m(6ρ2 − 1) +m(n(ρ1 − δ) + (n− 3)ρ1 + 3(ρ2 − 1)). (4)
6For example, we can set δ = 7, ρ1 = 13mn+ 8 and ρ2 = 13mn+ 11.
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Figure 1: An example instance of MAC corresponding to an instance of NAE3SAT with 4 variables
and 2 clauses x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3 and x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ x4: each rectangular represents an action; each line
(including the bottom line) in a rectangular represents one or multiple agents, whose names are
recorded to the right of the line; the number to the left of a line represents the cost for the agents to
take this action; in particular, the number to the left of the top line of a rectangular represents the
reward for the action.
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In an optimal solution, the payment for an action will not exceed the reward, so an agent will never
be incentivized to take an action whose cost is greater than the reward. The actions that an agent
will be potentially incentivized to take in an optimal solution is summarized as follows (since all
agents can take the zero action, we omit it in the following list).
• Agent Ai will potentially take action variable0i or variable1i .
• Agent T bi,j will potentially take action variablebi or, if variable xi appears in clause cj ,
clausej,k for some k.
• Agent Vj,k will potentially take action clausej,k.
Suppose the instance of NAE3SAT has a valid solution, then we set the payments in the instance of
MAC as follows.
• For each action variablebi , if the value of xbi is True, we set the payment to 0; otherwise
we set the payment to δ.
• For each action clausej,k with associated agents T h1i1,j, T h2i2,j, T h3i3,j , we set the payment to 1 if
the values of xh1i1 , x
h2
i2
, xh3i3 are all True; otherwise we set the payment to 0.
Under these payments, agent Vj,k will always take action clausej,k. If the value of xi is True, agent
Ai will take action variable1i ; otherwise she will take action variable
0
i . For agent T
b
i,j , if the
value of xbi is True and variable xi appears in clause cj , she will take action clausej,k for some k;
otherwise she will take action variablebi . Hence the total payoff of the principal is exactly (4).
Now suppose there exists a payment setting such that the optimal payoff of the principal is no
less than (4). We first show that agent Ai will take one of the actions variable0i and variable
1
i .
Otherwise, the payoff of the principal cannot exceed (n− 1)(ρ1 − δ) + 6mρ2 + 2mnρ2, which is
less than (4) by (1).
We define bi such that Ai takes action variablebii , then the payment for action variable
bi
i must
be no less than δ—the cost for agent Ai to take this action. If the payment is greater than δ, we
can adjust it to δ. After this adjustment, some agent T bii,j that takes action variable
bi
i before the
adjustment may turn out to take action clausej,k for some k. This is the only possible cause of
payoff loss of the principal. Suppose the payments for variablebii (before the adjustment) and
clausej,k are t1, t2 respectively, since agent T bii,j chooses to take action variable
bi
i before the
adjustment, we have t1 ≥ t2 − 1, so ρ2 − t2 ≥ ρ2 − t1 − 1 > ρ1 − t1 by (3). This means the
adjustment does not reduce the payoff of the principal, hence we can assume the payment for action
variablebii is exactly δ. By an analogous argument, we can also assume the payment for action
variable1−bii is exactly 0.
If there exist some i, j such that agent T bii,j does not take action variable
bi
i , it must take action
clausej,k for some k, and the payment t for action clausej,k must incentivize agent T bii,j to take
action clausej,k, i.e., it must satisfy
t− 1 ≥ δ. (5)
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Then we adjust the payment for action clausej,k to 1 so that agent T bii,j is incentivized to take
action variablebii . After this adjustment, at most three agents that take action clausej,k before
the adjustment deviate to take actions of the form variablek′· . Each of these agent brings a payoff
of ρ2 − t to the principal before the adjustment, and brings a payoff of at least ρ1 − δ after the
adjustment, so the adjustment reduces the payoff of the principal by at most 3(ρ2 − t− ρ1 + δ). On
the other hand, the payoff of the principal increases by t− 1 due to the contribution of agent Vj,k.
As a result, since t− 1 ≥ 3(ρ2 − t− ρ1 + δ) due to (2) and (5), this adjustment does not reduce the
payoff of the principal. Hence, we can assume for any i, j, agent T bii,j takes action variable
bi
i .
Suppose there exists some j such that the payment for action clausej,k is less than 1 for each k.
Suppose clause cj contains three variables xi1 , xi2 , xi3 , and action clausej,k0 is an action that the
cost for agent T 1−bi1i1,j to take is 1 (there may exist multiple such k0’s, and we arbitrarily choose
one). We then adjust the payment for clausej,k0 to 1. This adjustment attracts T
1−bi1
i1,j
to take action
clausej,k0 , which increases the payoff of the principal by ρ2 − 1 − ρ1. On the other hand, the
payoff of the principal contributed by Vj,k0 is decreased by at most 1, which is the only cause that
reduces the payoff of the principal. As a result, since ρ2 − 1− ρ1 > 1, the payoff of the principal
increases. Hence, we can assume for any j, there exists at least one k such that the payment for
action clausej,k is no less than 1.
Under the assumptions above, the maximum payoff of the principal is exactly (4). To achieve this
optimal payoff, for any j, say cj = xh1i1 ∨ xh2i2 ∨ xh3i3 , there exists exactly one k such that the payment
for clausej,k is 1, and its three associated agents T
1−bi1
i1,j
, T
1−bi2
i2,j
, T
1−bi3
i3,j
take this action. According
to Table 1, (1 − bi1) ⊕ h1, (1 − bi2) ⊕ h2, (1 − bi3) ⊕ h3 do not have the same value. So we can
set variable xi to the value 1 − bi (0 represents False and 1 represents True), then all clauses are
satisfied.
4 Increasing Differences
In this section, we consider the case where agents have different abilities. Roughly speaking, the
agents can be ordered from weak to strong, i1, i2, . . . , in, in the sense that it takes less cost for a
stronger agent to produce a certain amount reward. We have for each j ∈ [m],
ci1,j > ci2,j > · · · > cin,j, (6)
Additionally, we assume the costs obey increasing differences.
Definition 1. Given an instance of the Multiple Agents Contract Problem, we call the costs obey
increasing differences if there exists a permutation j1, j2, . . . , jm of 1, 2, . . . ,m and a permutation
i1, i2, . . . , in of 1, 2, . . . , n such that for any k < k′, 0 < cik,j1 − cik′ ,j1 < cik,j2 − cik′ ,j2 < · · · <
cik,jm − cik′ ,jm .
Though MAC is proved to be hard, we give a dynamic programming algorithm to solve the Multiple
Agents Contract Problem under the assumption that the costs obey increasing differences.
The permutation i1, i2, . . . , in can be found in O(n log n) time by sorting c1,j, c2,j, . . . , cn,j for
an arbitrary j, then the permutation j1, j2, . . . , jm can be found in O(m logm) time by sorting
ci2,1 − ci1,1, ci2,2 − ci1,2, . . . , ci2,m − ci1,m. For convenience, we assume the actions and agents are
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already ordered without loss of generality, i.e., ik = jk = k for each k. The zero action is also
considered action 0.
Before describing the algorithm, we first show the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. If the costs obey increasing differences, then for any payment profile (t1, t2, . . . , tm), if
agent i and i′ take actions j and j′ respectively, then i < i′ ⇒ j ≤ j′.
Proof. Suppose i < i′ but j > j′. Since agent i prefers action j to j′, we have
tj − ci,j ≥ tj′ − ci,j′ . (7)
Similarly, since agent i′ prefers action j′ to j, we have
tj′ − ci′,j′ ≥ tj − ci′,j. (8)
By combining (7) and (8), we have
ci,j − ci′,j ≤ ci,j′ − ci′,j′ . (9)
However, since i < i′ and j > j′, by increasing differences we have ci,j − ci′,j > ci,j′ − ci′,j′ , which
contradicts to (9). Therefore, we must have i < i′ ⇒ j ≤ j′.
Lemma 2. Given any 0 ≤ j1 ≤ · · · ≤ jm ≤ m, we have
1. Under the constraint that agent i is incentivized to take action ji, the optimal payoff of the
principal cannot exceed
n−1∑
i=1
(ρji − ci,ji − (n− i) (ci,ji − ci+1,ji)) + ρjn − cn,jn . (10)
2. If the costs obey increasing differences, and we set the payment profile (t1, t2, . . . , tm) such
that
tj =

∑i−1
i′=1
(
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′
)
+ ci,ji , if there ex-
ists i such
that j =
ji
7,
0, otherwise,
(11)
then the payoff of the principal is no less than (10).
Proof. Since agent i′ prefers action ji′ to ji′−1, we have
tji′ − ci′,ji′ ≥ tji′−1 − ci′,ji′−1 , (12)
7If there exist multiple such i’s, we arbitrarily choose one, because if, for example, j = jk′ = jk′+1 = · · · = jk,
then the value of
∑i−1
i′=1
(
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′
)
+ ci,ji is the same for i = k
′, k′ + 1, . . . , k.
8
and for i′ = 1 we have tj1 − ci,j1 ≥ 0 since agent 1 prefers action j1 to the zero action. By summing
up (12) for i′ = 1, 2, . . . , i, we have
tji ≥
i−1∑
i′=1
(
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′
)
+ ci,ji .
Hence,
n∑
i=1
tji ≥
n∑
i=1
(
i−1∑
i′=1
(
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′
)
+ ci,ji
)
=
n−1∑
i=1
(ci,ji + (n− i) (ci,ji − ci+1,ji)) + cn,jn ,
so the payoff of the principal cannot exceed (10).
On the other hand, suppose the costs obey increasing differences and we set tj according to (11).
For any agent i and any action j, there are three cases.
1. If there does not exist some k such that j = jk, then
tj − ci,j ≤ 0
≤
i−1∑
i′=1
(
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′
)
(13)
= tji − ci,ji ,
where the inequality (13) holds due to (6).
2. If there exists some k ≤ i such that j = jk, we have
tj − ci,j
=
k−1∑
i′=1
(
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′
)
+ ck,jk − ci,jk
=
k−1∑
i′=1
(
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′
)
+
i−1∑
i′=k
(ci′,jk − ci′+1,jk)
≤
k−1∑
i′=1
(
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′
)
+
i−1∑
i′=k
(
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′
)
(14)
=
i−1∑
i′=1
(
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′
)
= tji − ci,ji ,
where the inequality (14) holds due to increasing differences: for any i′ ≥ k, ci′,jk−ci′+1,jk ≤
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′ .
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3. If there exists some k > i such that j = jk, we have
tj − ci,j
=
k−1∑
i′=1
(
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′
)− (ci,jk − ck,jk)
=
i−1∑
i′=1
(
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′
)
+
k−1∑
i′=i
(
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′
)− k−1∑
i′=i
(ci′,jk − ci′+1,jk)
≤
i−1∑
i′=1
(
ci′,ji′ − ci′+1,ji′
)
(15)
= tji − ci,ji ,
where the inequality (15) holds due to increasing differences: for any i′ < k, ci′,ji′ −
ci′+1,ji′ ≤ ci′,jk − ci′+1,jk .
Anyway, we have tj − ci,j ≤ tji − ci,ji , which means taking action ji maximizes agent i’s utility.
Note if agent i takes action ji for each i, the payoff of the principal is exactly (10). Recall that the
agents tie-break in favor of the principal, so the payoff of the principal is no less than (10).
Lemma 1 and 2 show that we can find 0 ≤ j1 ≤ j2 ≤ · · · ≤ jm ≤ m that maximizes (10), then
an optimal payment profile is given by (11). To find the optimal j1, j2, . . . , jm, we use a dynamic
programming algorithm. For convenience, we define φ(i, j) = ρj − ci,j − (n − i) (ci,j − ci+1,j)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, and define φ(n, j) = ρj − cn,j . We define the subproblem OPT(i, j) =
max0≤j1≤j2≤···≤ji≤j
∑i
i′=1 φ(i
′, ji′). We can see the optimal value of (10) is OPT(n,m), and we
have the recursion formula
OPT(i, j + 1) =
max
0≤k≤i
(
OPT(k, j) +
i∑
i′=k+1
φ(i′, j + 1)
)
with OPT(i, 0) = 0 for each i. Hence, the optimal value of (10), as well as the optimal j1, j2, . . . , jm,
can be computed in O(n2m) time. We conclude the result above as the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If the costs obey increasing differences, there is an O(n2m) algorithm solving the
Multiple Agents Contract Problem.
5 Real Number Actions
In previous sections, we considered the Multiple Agents Contract Problem with discrete actions
(DA). A natural generalization is to consider the problem where each agent can choose to produce
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an arbitrary reward in [0, 1]. We call this generalization Multiple Agents Contract Problem with
Real Number Actions (RNA), and formalize it as follows.
There is a principal and n agents. Each agent chooses to produce a reward x ∈ [0, 1] for the principal.
To take such an action, each agent has a cost which may differ from each other. We define ci(x) ≥ 0
as the cost for agent i to produce a reward x. We assume without loss of generality that ci(0) = 0
for all i, which means it is free for each agent to choose to produce nothing. To incentivize these
agents to produce rewards, the principal specifies a payment function t(x): each agent taking this
action will earn a payment t(x). The utility for agent i to produce x is t(x) − ci(x). Agents are
self-interested, meaning each agent will produce a reward that maximizes her utility. We assume
agents tie-break in favor of the principal. The payoff of the principal is the sum of the rewards
produced by these agents minus the payments given to the agents, i.e., if agent i produces a reward
xi, the payoff of the principal is
∑n
i=1(xi − t(xi)). Our goal is to design the payment function to
maximize the payoff of the principal.
Note in this paper, the functions t and ci’s are not necessarily continuous. To guarantee every agent
has an optimal action we only concern the payment function t where for all i, t(x) − ci(x) and
x− t(x) (in case of tie-breaking) are able to attain their maximums on [0, 1].
5.1 Hardness
We first show that this generalization is harder than our original problem by a reduction from DA to
RNA. Given an instance of DA, we can construct an instance of RNA by letting
ci(x) =

0, if x = 0,
ci,1+M
ρm+mM
, if 0 < x ≤ ρ1+M
ρm+mM
,
...
ci,j+jM
ρm+mM
, if ρj−1+(j−1)M
ρm+mM
< x ≤ ρj+jM
ρm+mM
,
...
ci,m+mM
ρm+mM
, if ρm−1+(m−1)M
ρm+mM
< x ≤ 1,
for each i, where M is a large enough number8. We will show how to construct an optimal payment
profile of the DA instance from an optimal payment function of the RNA instance. For convenience,
we define zj = (ρj + jM)/(ρm +mM) and z0 = 0.
Given an optimal payment function t(x) of the RNA instance, suppose agent i chooses to produce xi
and define ji such that zji−1 < xi ≤ zji (if xi = 0, then ji = 0). Now consider a fixed i. If xi < zji ,
we adjust the value of t(x) at x = zji to t(xi). Before this adjustment, agent i produces xi, and after
this adjustment, agent i has the same utility to produce zji as to produce xi, so agent i will produce
zji after the adjustment (recall the agent tie-breaks in favor of the principal), which increases the
payoff of the principal. On the other hand, for any other agent i′, t(xi)− ci′(zji) ≤ t(xi)− ci′(xi)
(since the cost function is weakly increasing), which means the utility of producing zji after the
adjustment does not exceed that of producing xi. Hence, for any agent except i, changing her
produced value to zji due to the adjustment does not decrease the payoff of the principal (recall
8It is sufficient to choose M = maxi,j{ci,j , ρj}+ 1.
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again that the agents tie-break in favor of the principal). As a result, the payoff of the principal is
increased by this adjustment, which contradicts to the fact that t(x) is optimal. Therefore, we can
assume xi = zji . The payoff of the principal under the payment function t(x) in the RNA instance
is pRNA =
∑n
i=1(zji − t(zji)).
Now we construct a payment profile (t1, t2, . . . , tm) of the DA instance where tj = t(zj)(ρm +
mM) − jM . Under this payment profile, for each agent i and each j, the utility of agent i to
take action j is tj − ci,j , which is exactly (ρm +mM) times the utility of agent i to produce zj
under the payment function t(x) in the RNA instance. Also, agent i brings a payoff of ρj − tj to
the principal by taking action j, which is exactly (ρm +mM) times the payoff of the principal
brought by agent i by producing zj under the payment function t(x) in the RNA instance. Since
agent i produces zji under payment function t(x) in the RNA instance, she will take action ji under
payment profile (t1, t2, . . . , tm) in the DA instance. The payoff of the principal under the payment
profile (t1, t2, . . . , tm) in the DA instance is pDA =
∑n
i=1(ρji − tji) = (ρm +mM)pRNA.
To show the payment profile (t1, t2, . . . , tm) is optimal, we compare it to another arbitrary payment
profile (t′1, t
′
2, . . . , t
′
m). Suppose agent i takes action j
′
i under the payment profile (t
′
1, t
′
2, . . . , t
′
m),
then the payoff of the principal under the payment profile (t′1, t
′
2, . . . , t
′
m) in the DA instance is
p′DA =
∑n
i=1(ρji − t′ji).
Let
t′(x) =

0, if x = 0,
t′1+M
ρm+mM
, if 0 < x ≤ z1,
...
t′j+jM
ρm+mM
, if zj−1 < x ≤ zj,
...
t′m+mM
ρm+mM
, if zm−1 < x ≤ zm = 1.
We can see for all i, x − t′(x) and t′(x) − ci(x) are able to attain their maximum on [0, 1], so
t′(x) is a valid payment function. Under this payment function, agent i has the same utility for
producing a reward on (zj, zj+1], thus she will produce zj for some j in favor of the principal.
Observe, again, that under the payment profile (t′1, t
′
2, . . . , t
′
m), for each agent i and each j, the
utility of agent i to take action j is t′j − ci,j , which is exactly (ρm + mM) times the utility of
agent i to produce zj under the payment function t′(x) in the RNA instance. Also, agent i brings
a payoff of ρj − t′j to the principal by taking action j, which is exactly (ρm + mM) times the
payoff of the principal brought by agent i by producing zj under the payment function t′(x) in
the RNA instance. Hence, agent i will produce zj′i under the payment function t
′(x) in the RNA
instance. The payoff of the principal under the payment function t′(x) in the RNA instance is
p′RNA =
∑n
i=1(zji − t′(zji)) = p′DA/(ρm +mM).
Hence, p′DA = (ρm + mM)p
′
RNA ≤ (ρm + mM)pRNA = pDA, which means (t1, t2, . . . , tm) is
indeed an optimal payoff profile of the DA instance.
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5.2 An Approximate Contract
Knowing the RNA problem is hard, we are going to design an approximate contract. We assume for
all i, x−ci(x) is able to attain its maximum on [0, 1]. Let xi ∈ argmaxx∈[0,1](x−ci(x)) (if there are
multiple x′is achieving the maximum value, we arbitrarily choose one), yi = maxx∈[0,1](x− ci(x)),
we have immediately
yi = xi − ci(xi) ≤ xi. (16)
Let
ti(x) =
{
0, if 0 ≤ x ≤ yi,
x− yi, if yi < x ≤ 1.
We assume without loss of generality that y1 ≤ y2 ≤ · · · ≤ yn. We first show that ti(x) is a valid
payment function, i.e. for all i′, x− ti(x) and ti(x)− ci′(x) are able to attain their maximum on
[0, 1]. The former is trivial. For ti(x)− ci′(x), if 0 ≤ x ≤ yi, then ti(x)− ci′(x) = −ci′(x) ≤ 0; if
yi < x ≤ 1, then ti(x)− ci′(x) = x− yi − ci′(x) ≤ yi′ − yi, so ti(x)− ci′(x) ≤ max{0, yi′ − yi}.
In addition, ti(0)− ci′(0) = 0 and ti(xi′)− ci′(xi′) ≥ xi′ − yi − ci′(xi′) = yi′ − yi. This means the
maximum value of ti(x)− ci′(x) is max{0, yi′ − yi}, and is achievable at x = 0 or x = xi′ . Hence,
ti(x) is indeed a valid payment function.
Note the argument above also shows that for any i′ ≥ i, ti(x) − ci′(x) attains its maximum at
x = xi′ . By (16), we have xi′ ≥ yi′ ≥ yi, so if agent i′ chooses to produce xi′ , she brings a payoff
of xi′ − ti(xi′) = xi′ − (xi′ − yi) = yi to the principal. Recall that the agents tie-break in favor
of the principal, agent i′ brings a payoff of at least yi to the principal. Hence, under the payment
function ti(x), the payoff of the principal is at least (n− i+ 1)yi. Let i∗ ∈ argmaxi(n− i+ 1)yi,
then we have for all i,
yi ≤ (n− i
∗ + 1)yi∗
n− i+ 1 .
On the other hand, let OPT denote the optimal payoff of the principal. Since agent i brings a payoff
of at most maxx∈[0,1](x− ci(x)) = yi to the principal, we have OPT ≤
∑n
i=1 yi. Hence,
OPT ≤
n∑
i=1
yi ≤ (n− i∗ + 1)yi∗
n∑
i=1
1
n− i+ 1 .
This means the payment function ti∗(x) is an
∑n
i=1(1/(n− i+ 1))-approximate solution, i.e. an
O(log n)-approximate solution.
In conclusion, we have the following algorithm.
1. For any i, find yi = maxx∈[0,1](x− ci(x)) and sort them such that y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ yn.
2. Let i∗ ∈ argmax1≤i≤n(n− i∗ + 1)yi∗ .
3. Output the payment function
t(x) =
{
0, if 0 ≤ x ≤ yi∗ ,
x− yi∗ , if yi∗ < x ≤ 1.
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